Space Traffic Management and Surface Transportation: Operating Concepts for Commercial Spaceports by Ball, Jim
Space Traffic Management Conference 2014 Roadmap to the Stars 
Nov 5th, 10:30 AM 
Space Traffic Management and Surface Transportation: Operating 
Concepts for Commercial Spaceports 
Jim Ball 
Spaceport Strategies, jimball@spaceportstrategies.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/stm 
Ball, Jim, "Space Traffic Management and Surface Transportation: Operating Concepts for Commercial 
Spaceports" (2014). Space Traffic Management Conference. 19. 
https://commons.erau.edu/stm/2014/wednesday/19 
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Space Traffic Management Conference by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Space Traffic Management Conference 
Presented November 5, 2014 
 
             Copyright © James E. Ball, All Rights Reserved                                                                Page 1 of 10 
 
 
Space Traffic Management and Surface Transportation: 
Operating Concepts for Commercial Spaceports 
  
Spaceport Development and Regulation 
Author 
James E. Ball, Principal 
Spaceport Strategies LLC 
jimball@spaceportstrategies.com 
 
 
 The management of space traffic begins with the integration of space launch and re-
entry activities into the multi-modal environment of surface transportation.  Most of the 
discussion and conceptual development of space transportation management to date has 
been focused on the integration of commercial space transportation into the National 
Airspace System (NAS).  But there is also a need for spaceport site planning and operating 
concepts that effectively and safely integrate commercial space launch and re-entry into the 
established transportation infrastructure of various surface systems -- highways, railways, 
and waterways.  The market demand for exclusively commercial spaceport capacity to meet 
the schedule and service requirements of private and other non-government launch 
customers is pushing launch site selection into new locations separated from the secured 
boundaries of existing federal launch installations. As a result, new spaceport operating 
concepts and procedures will be required to integrate space transportation into these new 
sites and the surface transportation networks existing in the launch area. This paper uses the 
proposed Shiloh Launch Complex and other examples to present site development and 
operating concepts for integrating space launch traffic with surface transportation. 
 
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: FROM THE GROUND UP 
 
 In a fundamental sense, space traffic is not unlike any other form of transportation.  It is about moving 
people and cargo from one point to another.  While all forms of surface and airborne transportation operate in their 
own uniquely defined transportation “lanes” and corridors, they invariably cross those used by other modes at some 
point of the trip.  Transportation infrastructure and traffic management operations have evolved to avoid or 
minimize the potential conflicts and to optimize the availability and use of transportation routes needed by multiple 
modes of travel. 
 For space transportation, the first 60 years of its history has been characterized by the relative isolation of 
the nation’s few government launch ranges, located directly on remote stretches of seashore and on federally-
restricted property reservations.  Even so, offshore warning areas and special use airspace, together with maritime 
danger area traffic restrictions are required for every mission. 
 Today, the market demand for exclusively commercial spaceport capacity is requiring new spaceport 
locations separated from the limitations, restrictions, and impediments inherent in the government operating 
environment within the secured fence lines of federal launch installations.  As commercial space transportation 
launch capabilities and user markets evolve and expand, new dedicated sites will be identified, developed, and 
operated solely under FAA regulatory codes and standards.
1
   
 Commercial space transportation is already becoming an element of the nation’s transportation-enabled 
economy, and it must necessarily be integrated into the existing network of transportation infrastructure and traffic 
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routes.  Florida, for example, has already incorporated space transportation into its statewide Strategic Intermodal 
Systems Plan.
2
  How to avoid, minimize, and efficiently manage potential conflicts between space traffic and 
surface transportation will be among the key considerations for prospective new spaceport sites. 
 The issues and operational challenges of space traffic transition through the National Airspace System 
(NAS) have been the subject of much study and is a critical focus for the siting of both spaceports supporting 
commercial orbital flights from coastal locations as well as suborbital flights planned from coastal and inland 
spaceport locations.  However, far less attention has been devoted to date on how to identify and manage the 
potential conflicts of space traffic with surface transportation.  This paper focuses on such siting considerations and 
presents operational concepts for a prospective new commercial spaceport supporting both orbital and suborbital 
flights in the medium to heavy launch vehicle class – the proposed Shiloh Launch Complex in Florida. 
 The footprint of potential space traffic impact on or by surface transportation activities is determined by the 
extent of area affected by hazard zones.  Hazard zones are established to protect the public from exposure to a 
possible accident during a pre-launch test, or during a launch operation that could include both a flight vehicle’s 
trajectory on its way to space, and the return trajectory of a “fly back” booster stage or suborbital flight vehicle.  The 
duration of the potential impact is determined by how long a hazard remains in effect. 
 This ground footprint varies according to the size of the launch vehicle, the types and quantities of 
propellants used, and the nature of the operation (i.e. ground pre-launch test versus actual flight).  It is determined by 
the launch site operator, or the launch operator, based on FAA regulations and standards.  For the types of medium 
to heavy, liquid-fueled launch vehicles considered for the Shiloh Launch Complex, and for other prospective new 
spaceport sites in other states, these areas can be assumed to be the same, independent of the specific site. 
 The required “cleared area” for pre-launch test operations that are considered to pose a potential hazard in 
the event of an accident range from approximately 3,400 feet to nearly one mile in all directions from the launch 
pad.  These launch preparation tests involve filling the launch vehicle with its full load of propellants – often 
referred to as a “wet dress” rehearsal of the launch countdown procedures – to verify that both the ground propellant 
loading system and its interfaces with the flight vehicle systems are ready for launch day.   In addition, such an 
operation can also include a brief, on the pad firing of the launch vehicle’s engines – referred to as a static test firing 
– as a check of the main propulsion system.  
 
Figure 1.  Anticipated “cleared area” required for pre-launch hazardous tests at Shiloh 
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 Considering a one mile radius around the notional launch point will provide a conservative “clear zone” to 
evaluate the potential impacts on or from any other transportation routes or infrastructure that are within that zone.  
Figure 1 depicts the notional areas for each of the two proposed Shiloh launch pads that would need to be managed 
for public safety during these types of pre-launch tests. 
 For these non-flight launch site operations, the potential explosive hazard which drives the requirement for 
restricting unauthorized personnel or activities from entering the perimeter of the area begins with the filling of the 
vehicle tanks with propellant and ends when the test is concluded with drain back of the propellants into the launch 
site storage tanks.  The expected duration for these operations ranges from 6-8 hours.  Surface traffic using trails, 
roads, highways, railways, or waterways that transit this clear zone must detour to another route or otherwise remain 
clear of the area while the operation is in progress. 
 Thus, space-related traffic management actually can be considered to begin on the ground before the launch 
vehicle ever lifts away from its parking spot on the launch pad.  Siting of a prospective launch facility to avoid or 
minimize the types and extent of existing surface transportation infrastructure within the area required to be clear 
during non-flight launch site operations can greatly reduce the extent of potential impacts on or from surface 
transportation uses. 
 
THE OVERFLIGHT EXCLUSION ZONE: A REGULATORY TRAFFIC LANE 
 
 When a launch vehicle takes flight from its pad, it rapidly climbs in altitude as it travels away from the 
launch point.  A representative launch trajectory has passed through an altitude of 60,000 feet (the ceiling of the 
NAS) at a distance of about 10 nautical miles downrange from its launch pad.
3
 
 The launch direction, or launch azimuth, of a flight can vary according to its mission.  For launches 
proposed to occur from the Shiloh Launch Complex, the most northeasterly trajectory would be at a true compass 
heading of 35° and the most southeasterly trajectory would be at a true compass heading of 100°.
4
  Typical 
commercial communications satellite launches to geostationary orbit are generally at a due east -- 90° -- heading.  
Launch trajectory is critical to determining the potential area of impact on or by other transportation modes because 
of the FAA requirement for an Overflight Exclusion Zone (OEZ) to ensure the safety of the public on the ground, on 
inland waters, or near the Atlantic shoreline during this initial phase of flight. 
 The FAA defines in its Part 420 published regulations this safety clear zone, and has established 
conservative boundaries for this area based on launch vehicle payload lift capacity. The FAA defines the OEZ as “a 
portion of a flight corridor which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch vehicle”.5 
 For the types of launch vehicles proposed for the Shiloh Launch Complex, or for any other proposed 
commercial launch site developed for similar operators, the OEZ required to meet the FAA requirement in §420.23 
and Table A-2 of Part 420, Appendix A is the area within 2.1 nautical miles (2.5 miles) of the launch point, and the 
surface area contained within 2.5 miles of the launch vehicle’s flight path.  This portion of the flight corridor must 
remain clear of the public during the flight of the launch vehicle.  The procedures for a license applicant to define 
the OEZ are provided in Part 420, Appendix A (See Figure 2).  The OEZ derived from this table would extend for 
some 17 statute miles downrange from the launch site and out into the Atlantic Ocean.  As a practical and 
jurisdictional matter, the capability to control maritime traffic is limited to U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 
miles from the Atlantic shoreline. 
 In effect, the OEZ defines by regulation a space traffic lane that is 2.5 miles in all directions from the 
takeoff point and extends 2.5 miles on either side of the vehicle flight direction.  This “traffic lane” must remain 
clear of surface traffic for the duration of the launch operation.  For orbital launches of expendable boosters, or for 
any that do not require a return of a flight element (such as a reusable first stage booster) to the launch site, the 
duration of the launch operation to clear from the OEZ is between approximately 60-90 seconds.  For emerging 
commercial launch systems that plan to “fly back” first stage boosters for refurbishment and  reuse, the same general 
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trajectory could be followed in reverse for the return to a landing pad near the launch site.  In that case, the launch 
OEZ would need to remain in effect for an additional period estimated at about 15-20 minutes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Depiction of the Overflight Exclusion Zone (OEZ) in Part 420, Appendix A  
 
 Using the FAA-prescribed boundary determination method, Exhibit 3 and 4 below show the OEZ that 
would be associated with a 35° launch azimuth and a 90° launch azimuth from one of the two potential launch pad 
locations in the proposed Shiloh Launch Complex. These examples show how launch site planning and operating 
concepts can avoid or minimize conflicts with surface transportation infrastructure and usage. They also illustrate 
the areas, for these launch scenarios, which would require operational planning related to traffic management of 
roads, the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway (ICW), and the open, navigable waters of inland bodies. 
 
 
Figure 3.  OEZ for a 35° launch azimuth         Figure 4.  OEZ for a 90° launch azimuth 
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LIVING WITH A MULTI-MODAL WORLD: SPACEPORT SITING CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 Commercial spaceport sites designed for orbital missions must support launch providers who assemble, 
integrate, launch, and perhaps recover and refurbish very large flight elements of their launch system.  In addition, 
these launch providers must receive and process satellites, capsules, or other payloads that their boosters will lift into 
space. 
 A spaceport necessarily needs close proximity to a multi-modal network of transportation infrastructure to 
deliver these elements, or their component parts, to the launch site processing facilities. A launch provider will 
typically use a combination of over-highway, air cargo, and ocean-going vessels to transport launch vehicle 
hardware and receive customer payloads.  In addition, the movement of customer personnel and other transient 
staffing into the launch area in the weeks leading up to a mission rely on an efficient transportation network, such as 
a nearby international airport. 
 This need for close proximity to a multi-modal transportation network also results in the increased potential 
for operational conflicts resulting from the currently adopted FAA regulations and standards. Normal surface 
transportation activities that fall within those temporary hazard area boundaries will be interrupted.  The prescriptive 
definition of the OEZ boundary in FAA regulations provides a ground overlay on any prospective launch site that 
allows early identification of these potential operational conflicts and whether they can reasonably be addressed. 
 
MARITIME TRAFFIC: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO MINIMIZING CONFLICTS 
 
 Designation of offshore launch hazard areas, along with restrictions on maritime traffic on near-shore and 
inland waters have been required operations for space missions conducted from federal ranges since the early days 
of space transportation.  These controls were implemented by federal range managers to protect maritime traffic 
from the risks of an errant booster or launch accident. 
 Identification of safety zones temporarily closing some areas of navigable waters to boating traffic and 
maritime activities have traditionally been the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard, implemented as requested by 
federal agencies and commercial launch providers operating from established federal ranges, such as those operated 
by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) at Cape Canaveral and by NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility on the eastern shore of 
Virginia. 
 A launch organization’s specific mission requirements for safety zones have to date been coordinated under 
a formal support agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard, which then would publish the designated danger or hazard 
zone boundaries, restrictions, and effective dates/times in Notices to Mariners.  Patrols to help identify the perimeter 
of the zones and provide for enforcement of the published restrictions are furnished under specific operational 
support plans, with the cooperation of the volunteer U.S. Coast Guard auxiliary and the marine law enforcement 
units of state and local jurisdictions. 
 U.S. Coast Guard District Commanders are authorized to designate safety and hazard zones in territorial 
waters of the United States, including inland waters.
6
  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also has statutory 
authority to designate safety zones.
7
 
 With the emergence of commercial spaceports operating separate and apart from the federal spaceports and 
ranges, the processes for determining and designating the maritime hazard areas and mechanisms for the 
enforcement of traffic restrictions to meet FAA launch safety regulations are being reviewed by the FAA with these 
other federal organizations to adapt existing practices to the evolving space transportation industry. 
 Offshore and near-shore restrictions on marine traffic will be required for a defined area of the Gulf of 
Mexico adjacent to the SpaceX Boca Chica Beach site in Texas.
8
  The same FAA safety regulation would apply to 
an OEZ for spaceport sites proposed or considered in coastal Georgia and North Carolina, resulting in safety zone 
designations and enforcement of area boundaries in offshore and inland water bodies.  Safety zone areas that would 
be required for the proposed Shiloh Launch Complex in Florida are in the process of being defined. 
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Intracoastal Waterway Traffic Management 
 
 For the first time, commercial spaceport site operators and launch providers are seeking to use locations 
that would require overflight of the designated Atlantic ICW. 
 In Florida, some areas of inland water bodies – portions 
of Mosquito Lagoon, Indian River Lagoon, and the Banana River 
-- lying within the property boundaries of NASA’s Kennedy 
Space Center have been regularly restricted for both launch 
safety and security purposes during NASA or Department of 
Defense missions since the 1960s.  The East Central Florida ICW 
channel, which passes through KSC from a point near Oak Hill 
to a point west of the Haulover Canal in Brevard County, has 
remained just outside the safety zone boundary for NASA 
launches. 
 Launches from either of the two proposed Shiloh launch 
pads would overfly the ICW and require safety zone restrictions 
on ICW traffic for launch operations.  Launches from the 
proposed Camden Spaceport site
9
 in Georgia would overfly the 
ICW inside of Cumberland Island.  For the site considered in 
North Carolina
10
, a launch would not overfly the route of the 
Atlantic ICW but would overfly the inland water routes of 
Pamlico Sound. 
 ICW traffic is currently interrupted for normally short 
durations as a result of its intersection with bridges for vehicular 
traffic, and in some locations, for rail line traffic. 
         Figure 5.  Route of Atlantic ICW 
 
 ICW traffic is not affected by overflight of commercial air traffic, but current FAA safety regulations will 
require ICW traffic interruptions unless a case can be made to justify a waiver of the standard – a very tall order for 
a site operator or launch operator at this point of the industry’s maturity. 
 Operating approaches to managing ICW traffic flow for both its commercial and recreational users is being 
developed and proposed for the Shiloh Launch Complex in conjunction with the FAA’s on-going preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement evaluating the Space Florida-proposed spaceport. 
 The actual hazard for which the safety zone area is established – the launch and overflight of the launch 
vehicle on its trajectory --   is an event of short duration of minutes for a nominal countdown.  The OEZ “traffic 
lane” of five miles width must remain clear of vessels only for that period of flight.  Therefore, one practical 
solution to minimize interruption to that ICW flow is to permit continuing thru traffic in both directions up until a 
reasonable hold point prior to the scheduled launch.  Vessels under power that can travel thru the five-mile stretch of 
the ICW in a reasonably predictable time frame, say an hour, could continue to proceed in the ICW until the point in 
the countdown is reached to hold further traffic until after the launch takes place and the hazard no longer exists. 
 In the event of an unplanned launch delay that will result in the mission not meeting its launch window for 
that day, the restriction on ICW traffic can be lifted and thru traffic resumed.  An updated Notice to Mariners can 
then be issued to advise when the danger zone will be put back into effect. 
  
Open Water Traffic Management 
 
 Open waters within an OEZ are also required to be clear of marine traffic of any type and any anchored 
vessels during the launch operation.  The safety zone boundary can be defined by the compass heading of the launch 
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azimuth, on a line extending across the inland water body and out into the Atlantic Ocean at the required 2.5 mile 
separation from the launch vehicle trajectory track.  Surface patrol boats and aerial surveillance can be employed to 
monitor and enforce the safety zone restrictions until they are lifted after the launch. 
 The implementation of danger zone areas will need to be operationally defined in detail for effective 
coordination of roles and responsibilities among the launch operator, the designating federal authority, and the 
launch area surveillance and enforcement elements.  Public awareness and effective communication with the boating 
public and commercial maritime interests will also be a critical responsibility of the launch site operator and/or the 
launch operator.  Formalized written agreements from which operational plans and inter-agency coordination are 
derived, are required by FAA-issued launch site and launch licenses, together with specific notification requirements 
to the public and maritime interests. 
 
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION OVER HIGHWAYS AND RAIL 
 
 In consideration of prospective launch site locations, an OEZ overlay on a major Interstate highway, such 
as I-95, or a high-traffic railroad line, can pose challenges that result in the site being impractical to develop and 
operate under existing regulations. 
 Operational impact concerns over the existing or proposed co-location of railroad lines through the federal 
launch installation on both coasts have existed for decades.  In California, an existing Amtrack passenger service 
line runs through Vandenberg Air Force Base and is subject to interruption for launch operations.  In Florida, Port 
Canaveral has long sought a rail link to support its cargo operations.  For nearly 40 years, it has been unable to 
persuade the USAF to permit a line across Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to link with existing rail at KSC.   
 Currently, Port Canaveral is evaluating other alternative routes to link rail with the KSC line. One proposed 
route would extend across the Banana River and then proceed up along Kennedy Parkway (State Road 3) to the 
existing rail in KSC’s Industrial Area.11  This route would provide a freight rail line connection sufficiently 
separated from the beach side launch pads of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and KSC to avoid operational 
launch conflicts.   
 While government space operations would be expected to hold priority use in any scheduling conflicts with 
rail commerce, it is not so clear how scheduling conflicts between space transportation commerce and railroad 
commerce will be handled.  Clearly, the potential for conflicts is best avoided, and otherwise, a process for schedule 
de-confliction will be required between the respective operators. 
 With respect to highways, the transportation commerce supported by the nation’s interstate highway system 
and its use by the traveling public is critical to our economy.  An OEZ overlay on an interstate highway would be 
considered an unacceptable transportation conflict as the space transportation industry exists today.  Re-routing of 
interstate traffic on a recurring basis to an alternate highway of adequate capacity might be considered but would not 
likely prove an acceptable option. Re-location of the interstate route would be a prohibitively costly alternative. 
 Less critical highway routes and low-volume secondary roads can be managed to prevent vehicular traffic 
from entering a hazard zone associated with a launch site.  Temporary re-routing of traffic coupled with road use 
restrictions at and near the boundaries of the hazard areas can effectively manage traffic flows and limit 
interruptions and inconvenience without compromising safety standards. 
 Using the OEZs illustrated for the Shiloh Launch Complex as an example, there would be no disruption of 
traffic flows on either I-95 or U.S. 1 through northern Brevard County and Southern Volusia County.  Public use of 
Kennedy Parkway North (State Road 3) through the area of Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge north of KSC’s 
secured perimeter would be the only secondary road requiring restrictions on thru traffic at points appropriate to 
secure the hazard area during a pre-launch test or launch operation.   When these hazard areas and access controls 
needed to be established, refuge visitors and KSC employees would be re-routed down U.S. 1 to the Max Brewer 
Causeway, State Road 402.  Some local roads could also be temporarily restricted in order to preclude inadvertent 
public entry into the OEZ. 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Space Traffic Management Conference 
Presented November 5, 2014 
 
             Copyright © James E. Ball, All Rights Reserved                                                                Page 8 of 10 
 
 The proposed site for a Georgia spaceport in Camden County also offers a launch point OEZ that would not 
encroach on I-95 or any primary highway.  It is situated at the terminus of a secondary road that intersects with I-95 
approximately 9 miles from the proposed launch facility.  An orbital-capable launch site examined in North Carolina 
and situated on the “inner banks” of Pamlico Sound would be accessed from a rural secondary road a considerable 
distance from any major highway or interstate, but would result in overflight of the only highway along the North 
Carolina Outer Banks. 
 The Boca Chica Beach launch site selected by SpaceX for a commercial spaceport east of Brownsville, 
Texas is at the terminus of Texas State Road 4, requiring restrictions only on east-bound traffic at a control point a 
few miles west of the planned pad. 
 
MANAGING AND MINIMIZING POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE WITH FOOT TRAFFIC 
 
 As spaceport sites that require OEZs as an element of their FAA license are established and operated 
outside the secured fence lines of the existing federal launch facilities of NASA and the Department of Defense, 
there will also be a need to consider and mitigate the possible interruption of foot traffic on hiking trails and remote 
beach areas accessible only by foot. 
 Potential impacts of space transportation on the public use of areas that would normally be accessible by 
pedestrian traffic but must be temporarily restricted due to public access control requirements during hazardous 
operations are an important aspect of the FAA’s review of a proposed commercial launch site.  Coastal sites that 
offer the best locations for avoiding conflicts with other transportation systems and urban populations invariably will 
result in some impacts on areas that could be accessed by foot traffic via established trails or unrestricted seashore. 
 Early site and operations planning for prospective commercial launch sites can identify these existing 
routes people use to access areas on foot, providing the opportunity to design and operate launch facilities to reduce, 
eliminate, and mitigate these potential traffic conflicts. 
 For the proposed Shiloh Launch Complex, for example, the range of planned launch azimuths are limited 
such that there is no impact to public access to the southern portion of the Canaveral National Seashore, an area 
known as Playalinda Beach, and minimal impact to public access to the northern area known as Apollo Beach.  
However, all launches occurring from Shiloh would overfly the remote 12-mile stretch of Canaveral National 
Seashore known as Klondike Beach, accessible only by foot and limited already by the number of daily permits 
issued by the National Park Service for seashore hikers. 
 Launches from the proposed Camden Spaceport would overfly portions of the Cumberland Island National 
Seashore normally accessible by day visitors and perhaps portions of Jekyll Island as well. Some potential launch 
sites that have been considered in North Carolina would overfly a stretch of the Outer Banks.  The new Texas 
commercial spaceport to be built and operated by SpaceX will impact foot traffic on an eight-mile stretch of 
shoreline at Boca Chica Beach and a number of trails in the neighboring wildlife refuge and parks. 
 Site and operations planning for the Shiloh site in Florida has sought to limit the beach and inland areas 
affected by OEZ access controls, and maintain access to the established hiking trails and other popular visitor areas 
of the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge and Canaveral National Seashore, both of which lie almost entirely 
within the unsecured and secured property boundaries of the Kennedy Space Center. 
 
OPERATIONS TO MINIMIZE SURFACE TRAFFIC INTERRUPTIONS 
 
 Launch site operators can employ a number of operational approaches to minimize surface traffic and 
access interruptions, while complying with the public access control requirements of their FAA licenses. 
 A key to site planning and operation is determining the boundaries of the OEZs for each launch point, and 
for the range of planned launch azimuths from those points.  Public access controls are only required for the actual 
time during which a launch-related hazard exists.  For some areas of the OEZ, that duration will likely extend from 
about two hours prior to the planned launch, through its scheduled liftoff time, and potentially through the end of the 
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available launch window.  For other areas covered by the OEZ, the actual hazard for which the FAA requires the 
OEZ to be established will last only minutes after the launch vehicle takes off. 
 Operations to establish appropriate public access control points for vehicular traffic, maritime traffic, and 
foot traffic will need to be executed well before the scheduled launch time to ensure that the areas covered by the 
OEZ can be verified as clear of any traffic or individuals at the time the launch occurs.  However, procedures and 
launch site operator staffing can be deployed to allow for continued traffic access to some areas up until a prescribed 
point in the launch countdown. At that point, those areas would be cleared in time to support the scheduled launch.  
One example might be a designated beach parking area that would fall within the OEZ at the time of launch, but 
could remain accessible up to the required countdown point for that area to be cleared until after the launch. 
 Commercial launch site operators can minimize surface traffic conflicts with other commercial 
transportation interests – such as barge transportation in the ICW or railroad freight operations – by advance 
operations planning to coordinate schedules for passage through the short duration OEZs.  A cooperative and well-
managed communications plan between these operators can help minimize potential conflicts, especially if traffic 
volumes by the respective operators are low. 
 
THE FUTURE OF SPACE TRAFFIC AND SURFACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
 
 A fundamental objective of all traffic management is to reduce or eliminate the risk of collisions.  Tunnels 
and high bridges can allow vehicles to pass underneath or over marine shipping channels, airport taxiways can pass 
over high volume freeways, overpasses or signalized cross-walks allow pedestrians to safely cross over busy 
highways, railroad crossing gates and underpasses allow long freight and passenger trains to transit thru urban cities.  
 In managing space transportation integration with surface traffic, the primary consideration driving current 
FAA safety standards is the risk that a launch accident could produce vehicle debris, or even a substantially intact 
but uncontrolled launch vehicle, that might strike a surface transportation vehicle or exposed person in the area of 
the launch site, potentially resulting in one or more persons on the ground sustaining an injury or death.  There is no 
chance that a launch vehicle on its way to space would collide with a surface vehicle during a nominal launch event.  
The chance that a surface vehicle moving through the OEZ might be at the point of a launch vehicle or debris impact 
at any particular moment of the flight is extremely remote but challenging to analyze and quantify. 
 At present, the prescribed FAA methodology for determining the OEZ for a launch site operator provides a 
five-mile-wide lane to protect against such a potential risk.  Beyond and outside of the OEZ, a launch operator must 
additionally demonstrate by analysis that the risk of such a casualty to any one individual is no greater than a 
probability of one in a million, and that the collective risk to the public in general for such casualties throughout the 
entire launch operation is no greater than 30 in a million.
12
 
 Space launch vehicle reliability and safety systems to limit the potential hazards resulting from a launch 
failure continue to improve in an industry that must demonstrate and maintain an exceptionally high standard of safe 
operation.  An improved understanding of both the probability of specific types of launch accidents, and the actual 
documented track record of debris dispersion and possible impact consequences is needed to assess the actual risk 
posed to surface vehicle traffic during space launches. 
 While there will always remain a potential for launch accidents to occur, it seems probable that the 
conservative analysis of launch risks that have prevailed for the past five decades will eventually be supplemented 
by actual launch data and demonstrated flight safety systems. When combined, these may allow for less restriction 
of surface transportation in the vicinity of a launch area. 
 Until then, and in light of the years-long process of revising the existing FAA statutory regulations, 
commercial launch site and launch operators will need to develop best practices and procedures for effectively 
planning and operating their new spaceports to co-exist, and co-operate with the existing multi-modal surface 
transportation network within their planned launch area. 
 
 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Space Traffic Management Conference 
Presented November 5, 2014 
 
             Copyright © James E. Ball, All Rights Reserved                                                                Page 10 of 10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1   FAA Office of Space Transportation, Final Environmental Impact Statement – SpaceX Texas Launch Site, May 
     2014, and, FAA Record of Decision, July 9, 2014 
2    Florida Department of Transportation, Florida’s Strategic Intermodal Systems Strategic Plan,  2010 
3    Bilimoria, Karl D. and Jastrzebski, Michael, “Space Transition Corridors in the National Airspace System,” AIAA 
     Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operation Conference, August 13-14, 2013, Los Angeles, CA 
4    FAA Office of Space Transportation Public Scoping Meeting Fact Sheet for the Shiloh Launch Complex, February 
     11-12, 2014, and, operational parameters furnished to the FAA in support of the EIS analysis 
5    Title 14 CFR, Chapter III, Part 420.5, Definitions 
6    U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, PART 165 — REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS 
     [ 33 CFR 165 ] 
7    Title 33, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, PART 334 – DANGER ZONE AND RESTRICTED AREA REGULATIONS 
8    FAA Office of Space Transportation, Final Environmental Impact Statement – SpaceX Texas Launch Site, May 
     2014 
9    Heglund, Emily, “Camden spaceport could be ‘turning point’ for Ga,” news article in The Camden County 
     Tribune and Georgian, October 9, 2014 
10  Hampton, Jeff, “Commercial spaceports eyed for eastern N.C.,” Pilotonline.com, November 15, 2009 
11  NASA, Kennedy Space Center Master Plan, published on-line, 2014 
12  U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 14 CFR, Part 431, Acceptable Flight Risk 
